final section of the paper discusses problems and extensions, and offers some concluding remarks.
TECHNOLOGIES AND BELIEFS
This section focuses on the relation between technology-types and the output that they yield. The first subsection formally defines this relation. The second subsection states four axioms that this relation obeys, and that agents' prior beliefs will recognize; these axioms lead agents to a unique prior over functions relating technology-types and output. Finally, the third subsection describes the choices that agents face.
2A. Technologies
There is a single output and a variety of technologies which can be used to produce it. Each technique is represented by an infinite-dimensional vector, x (x1, x2 ... ), where 0 <xi < 1. We are assuming, thus, a countable infinity of technology-types, and a continuum of each type. The output associated with x is z(x). z( ) is not an input-output relationship. Rather, x is a method of production, or more precisely, a combination of such methods, whereas z(x) is its net (of input costs) productivity. In particular, z can assume negative values.
Some concrete examples will help fix ideas. Suppose that dimension k refers to drilling oil at location k. Then Xk E [0,1] could be the depth at which drilling takes place, where 1 represents the maximum depth at which drilling is feasible. Alternatively, Xk can be thought of as the angle at which an arrow is shot. Then Xk = 0 could represent a direct aim (which invariably produces a miss at a significant distance), and x = 1 an aim vertically up in the air. Dimension k will be referred to as a technology-type, say for drilling oil or for archery. We are thus assuming a countable infinity of technology-types.
The "universe of techniques," [0, 1]', is a priori known. But what they yield, i.e., the function z( ), is not. That is, z( ) is a random function. Certain restrictions, pertaining to variations in a single component of x, will be imposed on z( ). Taken together they will lead to a prior measure over the outputs of all techniques.
Let 
2B. Beliefs about Technological Possibilities
Any parametric family of z's along with a prior over its parameters would imply a prior over the functions z. Such a prior typically assigns measure zero to a lot of functions z( ). We wish to derive the prior beliefs from postulates (deemed to be held by the agents in the model) about the nature of production. It is well known that in infinite-dimensional spaces there is no unique way to express complete ignorance.3 To get useful results, something must be assumed. On the other hand, beliefs must include a large enough collection of z(Q) functions so that things that do not seem too unreasonable a priori are included. Our approach is similar to methods followed in geostatistics4 in which predicted distributions of reserves of oil or ore at unexplored locations are formed roughly in the same way that our agents form beliefs about technologies they have not yet tried out. Similar methods are used in hydrology and meteorology.
The following axioms are imposed on beliefs.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Continuity): z(Q) is continuous in each variable separately. Thus, techniques are given locational context (setting a dial on a machine or drilling for oil in a certain location, for instance) and a slight change in Xk is assumed not to produce a dramatic change in output. The proportionality to z implies that as z grows, more will be at stake as one experiments with a new technology. This captures the well-known argument that retums to information are proportional to the operating scale at which the information is used (Wilson (1975) Q.E.D.
REMARK 1: Equation (2.1) says nothing about possible forms of dependence amongst the Wk (e.g., symmetric, or geometrically declining in k, etc.). Such dependence allows for a sort of transfer of knowledge (i.e., inferences) across technologies. While we shall comment later on the likely consequences of such dependence, our formal analysis will assume that the Wk are mutually independent.
REMARK 2: The ordering of the possibilities in the kth dimension is in the direction of increased subjective uncertainty. Technique k yields zero for sure if Xk is set at zero. The larger Xk, the larger is the uncertainty about the outcome. REMARK 3: The parameter a is thought of as measuring technological opportunity. Since o-is not indexed by k, every technology is ex ante equally promising. This is a consequence of the third axiom.
REMARK 4: Although technological discoveries interact because (2.1) is of a multiplicative form, neither current output nor (as we shall soon see) the prospects for future discovery depend on the order in which past discoveries were made. This will rule out certain kinds of "path dependence" in optimal search policies.
2C. Choices Available to Agents
Our aim is to look into Schumpeter's assertions about invention and cycles of activity, given what we regard as reasonable assumptions about the process of discovery and refinement. We do this in the simplest possible way, by having effectively just one agent. This agent could be Robinson Crusoe who consumes his own output, but a better interpretation is that of a firm that can appropriate the fruits of its search efforts for exactly one period. Later we shall comment on the likely effects of the presence of many agents, and of longer time horizons.
There are overlapping generations of risk-neutral agents that live one period. Each generation consists of exactly one member and each such member can make exactly one search. Search means selecting a new technique x, and observing its net productivity, z(x). As a result of past searches, at each point in time there is a body of empirical knowledge,5 Ht = {x1, z1, . The decision facing each generation is whether to sample extensively or intensively, and given the chosen mode of search, exactly which technique to sample. The payoff to each type of search will now be described in turn.
3A. Optimal Extensive Search
If extensive search is the chosen option, then the following theorem holds. This assumption is maintained for the rest of this section.
3B. Optimal Intensive Search
A history, Ht, induces a partition on each of the first nt coordinates. Sufficient statistics for the beliefs concerning the outcome of sampling within 6 The reason for assuming a search cost proportional to Z is that in practice, R & D is a highly labor-intensive activity, so that its social cost is essentially proportional to the foregone output that the scientists and engineers engaged in R&D could otherwise be producing. Moreover, Kuznets (1962, pp. 31-35), when discussing the problems of measuring the input into inventive activity, thought that the costs not captured in measured R&D were even more weighted towards the foregone labor input-the input of individual and independent inventors. At any rate, our assumption is that this foregone-output cost is incurred each time an extensive search is made. (We have eliminated the multiplicative factor Hil.*k(l + arw,*) which is common to (3.1) and (3.4).) Note that inequality (3.7) is time invariant, so that this proves the following theorem. Clearly, if v is not above the right-hand side of (3.8) at w = 0, it cannot exceed it for any co, because for co > 0, the right-hand side of (3.9) is no greater than the right-hand side of (3.10) (which, in turn is equal to 1), and for w < 0, the right-hand side of (3.9) is nonnegative while the right-hand side of (3.10) is zero. This proves the "only if' part of (i).
8 This theorem asserts in effect that "recall" to past unexplored opportunities does not matter. ,l3-a > 2(1 -cv2-7 /cr).
Also
A corollary of Theorem 3 concerns T, which we define as the (random) duration of intensive search. The largest number of times that one can sample within an interval of unit length without sampling an interval shorter than A is A-1 times. Therefore, taking the inverse of (3.12) yields the upper bound on the duration of Schumpeter's cycles:
THEOREM 5: T < c/2(a -c27), w.p.1.
3D. Two-Period Generations
This subsection will consider the case where an innovator can appropriate the value of his innovation for two periods. In that case, the preferred mode of search will be affected, of course, not just by its immediate payoff but also by the expected value of the subsequent search. Our purpose here is to compare the decision made by a one-period firm and a two-period firm at a specific point along the evolutionary path of the industry, namely, at a point where the one-period firm is indifferent between the two modes of search. It will be shown that under these circumstances the two-period firm prefers to do extensive search. This result lends support to the idea that firms guided by longer-term considerations will tend to engage in more venturesome research projects.9 THEOREM 6: Assume that for all subintervals which are indexed by a given history, and assume that an equality holds for at least one such subinterval. Then the two-period payoff under initial extensive search exceeds the two-period payoff under initial intensive search.
PROOF: From the discussion leading to equation (3.7) above, it is clear that the first-period-payoff, i.e., Zt is identical under the two modes of search. Hence, it only remains to compare the second period payoffs. We start out by proving the following.
CLAIM: If intensive search is initially undertaken, then the next search will necessarily be extensive (this is a stronger form of the "no going back" property that Theorem 2 asserts).
This claim certainly holds if the knowledge gained as a result of the initial (intensive) search does not represent an improvement upon the previously best-known method of production along the same technological dimension, i.e., if Wk(xj*) < w *. Concerning the case where Wk(xj*) > w *, it is clear that an intensive search in the second period could possibly take place only in (a, xk*) or in (Xk*, 3). We now rule out the possibility of a profitable intensive search in (a, X4*); the proof for (X*, ,3) is perfectly analogous.
Consider the derivatives with respect to wk* of both sides of (3.13): 9A complete analysis of the two period case is rather involved because of both the complexity of the "state space" (which comprises all possible histories of the search process) and the mixed nature of each firm's choice, consisting of n discrete and a continuous decision. An attempt to study this problem led to a highly cumbersome formulation, and we were not able to consummate the analysis.
where yk is the payoff maximizing search in ((J, xk) and where m* =m(y * = s(y *). In computing the second derivative, we had used the envelope theorem, recalling that v is the maximized value of u(m, s, w, ) (consult, again, the analysis leading to equation (3.7)).
Since (3.13) held with equality prior to the initial period search, the above computation shows that it will hold with strict inequality after that search. Hence, the second period search must be extensive, and the claim is proved.
Returning to the proof of the theorem, we now know that the second period payoff under intensive search is Z, (1 +-/ v(21r -c). On the other hand, Theorem 3 shows that the second period return to extensive search is at least Zt (1 + -/ 2l1r -c), and is actually higher whenever the outcome of the initial period (extensive) search is such that w < Wn,1+ (1) <iv. Furthermore, w < Wn,+ 1(l) < wv is a positive probability event.
Q.E.D.
This subsection has, strictly speaking, analyzed the change in the optimal search policy when instead of one-period, there are two-period non-overlapping generations. These generations have, in effect, monopoly power to perform two search decisions in a row. This comparison is meant to be only suggestive of the likely effects of longer-term patent protection on the nature of inventive activity that firms undertake.
EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND EVIDENCE
This section's aim is to convert the theorems proved in the last section into propositions about observables. This will now be done in two ways. The first subsection will discuss some fairly general features that one might look for in the time-series of output and inventive intensity. Then, the second subsection will discuss some specific major innovations and their subsequent refinement.
4A. General Time-Series Properties
One aim of this paper was to relate, qualitatively and quantitatively, Schumpeter's waves to the nature of the technology and to the way agents learn about it. How long is each wave of activity likely to last, and when will waves exist at all? Kuznets wondered if the occurrence of inventions would not be too regular to produce waves. How do the parameters of the model bear on these opposing views?
Periods of extensive search are usefully thought of as periods of invention. An invention of technique k that has Xk falling in the interval [w, wi] will be followed up by further refinement of that technique, which one might associate with more minor innovations, or imitation. We associate with Schumpeter the outcome that the industry oscillates between the state of the extensive search (E) and the state of intensive search (I). Each uninterrupted spell in state I is a "wave" of activity sparked by the discovery of a new technique. Not all discoveries lead to such waves: Only those techniques, k, with Wk(l) E D will In the figure, the region in which there is no growth should be dismissed as empirically irrelevant, at least at present, when positive growth on average is almost universal in industries. Since both extensive search (which produces the spark) and intensive search (which is defined as the long wave) are necessary for long waves to exist, the (c, a-) pairs must be in the shaded region, Schumpeter's region, whose shape is based on the inequality in Assumption 5, and on Theorem 3(i).
If c -* oo, the set D (defined just prior to Theorem 3) becomes the entire line, so that the (1, 1) cell of the above matrix becomes zero. The industry will never be in state E, and we are in the southeast region of Figure 2 . Moreover, if the industry is in I, any growth that takes place will be a short-run phenomenon, because along each technological dimension, the sample paths are bounded with probability one. On the other hand, if the parameters are such that D is empty, the economy will always stay in E, and we will get serially uncorrelated, i.i.d. long-run growth rates, with mean given by u/ 2-T -c. The northwest region may thus be termed Kuznets' region, because new discoveries are then occurring too frequently to permit waves to exist in between.
When u> c 27r, the following property is somewhat surprising. When technological opportunity (a) is high, waves of activity will be shorter, to the extent that they exist at all. The reason is that when opportunity for invention is high, the industry will produce a steady stream of it, too steady to admit cycles. On the other hand (and less surprisingly), the amplitude of the deviations away from trend will be positively related to a, since the randomness of the search process is positively related to it.
Consider now the probability of transiting between E and I. Let QT be the probability that the industry stays in I for an additional period, given that it has been there for T consecutive periods; the transition probabilities can be summarized by the matrix in Figure 2 . While the first row is time-invariant, the second is not. Indeed, Equation (16) Since the option of extensive search is always available, and since its return does not fluctuate, we certainly have gI > gE. Thus, one implication of our model is that the industry will grow faster during periods of intensive search. Since under Assumption 5 and the assumption of Theorem 2 neither state is absorbing, the long-run growth rate is a weighted average of g, and gE, the weights being the stationary-state probabilities. Now compare two industries, A and B, both in the Schumpeterian region, which have the same c, but different (J's. Industry B will have higher growth (see (4.1)), and shorter implementation waves (Theorem 5).10 This is a long-run implication, however, not to be confused with the short-run implication that waves of refinement (or imitation) represent periods of above-average growth.
4B. Evidence on Specific Innovations
Our theory emphasizes the supply side. It assumes that extensive search in some direction must precede further intensive exploration in that direction, and it analyzes the incentive aspects involved with the pursuit of these two kinds of activity. Kuznets (1962, esp. p. 22) found that the distinction between inventions on the one hand and improvements on those inventions on the other was a useful way to organize one's thinking about the growth of productive knowledge. But ultimately, if our dichotomy between discovery and its refinement is to be a useful one, one should be able to point to historical experience with particular inventions where this dichotomy makes sense.
One example is the artificial heart. The artificial heart program was started at the National Heart Institute with special congressional approval in 1963. This was indeed extensive search: A research program was aimed in a new direction; the main reason for it was the shortage of natural hearts. So far the only heart that the FDA has approved is the Jarvik heart, and although one recipient lived for 112 days following its implantation, everyone seems to agree that further improvement is needed and is likely.'1 The discovery of nylon also was the 10 If we think of A and B as two firms, then there is some tentative support for this result in the work of Griliches (1986) . Firm B faces greater technological opportunities than firm A and could thus be assumed to be spending more on "basic research." Griliches finds that productivity growth is indeed quite a bit higher in firms that do more basic research. Our view of causality here runs from higher uf on the one hand, to higher basic research and higher growth on the other. A referee pointed out, however, that this paper does not formalize basic research and more applied research, in the sense that both types of search in our model lead immediately to new ways of producing output in the subsequent period. This contrasts with the common perception that much of basic research is of no immediate commercial value. We therefore offer Griliches' evidence as merely suggestive.
11 See the US Congress (1982).
outcome of a conscious decision by DuPont in 1928 to explore new dimensions, new chemical explorations.12 Originally used for stockings, nylon has, through further refinements, been used in numerous other products since. The nuclear submarine too was, from the Navy's viewpoint, the outcome of search in a new dimension-alternative technologies such as the use of rechargeable batteries or carrying compressed air were unsatisfactory. In 1946 the US Navy made the decision to build the nuclear submarine which, because a nuclear reactor requires no oxygen, could stay underwater indefinitely. Aside from instances in which a decision was made to provide a particular new direction, these are further examples of less directed, but still extensive search. These are instances in which elements are combined at random, such as arise in the pharmaceutical industry. The conventional method for creating a new drug starts with largely random sampling of components that show signs of having a biological impact such as slowing tumor cell production. Companies typically screen 5000 or more substances before finding a compound that is both safe and effective.13 Recently, however, the advent of the computer (and computer graphics in particular) has led to a dramatic reduction in the cost of such search (in our model this amounts to a reduction in c). By simulating molecular interactions and generating images of molecules that might fit well with others, researchers are able to rule out a host of unpromising combinations without having to actually try them. Recently, computer graphics enabled researchers to predict that adding hydrogen to synthetic insulin molecules would lead to a smooth release of one insulin molecule at a time, and this will improve the treatment of diabetes. In our model, this reduction in c may push the pharmaceutical industry from Schumpeter's region into the region of i.i.d. growth (Figure 1) , where it will grow faster and more evenly.
Three further sets of inventions can be argued to have had an element analogous to the extensive search that the model describes.'4 First, the search for superconducting materials has proceeded by trial and error, and it affords an excellent example of a successful extensive search (the somewhat accidental discovery at the IBM Zurich lab of ceramic oxide that superconducted at 900 K) followed up by further intensive search involving experimentation with other oxides by other investigators (who discovered that certain types of copper oxide were better still, by superconducting between 110 and 1200 K).15 Second, the attempt to determine where each human gene is located on the 23 pairs of chromosomes has so far proceeded essentially at random. Of the estimated 50,000-150,000 human genes, only 1200 or so have been located thus far. As in the pharmaceutical example discussed in the previous paragraph, however, recent advances in computers have dramatically reduced the cost of searching for genes and it is likely that the remaining genes will be discovered at a much 12 Mueller (1962, p. 334 Although our theory assumes a single consumption good, one might extend the interpretation to include product innovation-a firm decides whether to invent a new product (extensive search), or refine an existing one (intensive search). Gort and Klepper (1982) gathered data on dozens of product innovations, and compiled a list of innovations that took place during the lifetimes of these 23 products.18 Our model would predict a tendency for the importance of the product improvements (as measured, say, by their effect on the growth-rate of the product's output) to successively decline-each successive intensive search is made from a distribution with a smaller variance. According to Gort and Klepper, innovations that occur during the early stages of the industry's development do indeed appear to be more important than the later ones.19
The instances given in this subsection are all examples of extensive search that, in several cases, was followed by intensive search. As such, these examples show that the distinction between extensive and intensive search is a useful one. But since these examples illustrate one-shot events, they do not constitute evidence of cycles or (except perhaps for the pharmaceutical example) perpetual extensive search. Documenting the latter would require one to look at the output (measured in terms of product and process innovations) of a particular type of research activity over an extended period of time.
EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper derives a variant of Schumpeter's cycles from some minimal assumptions about technological knowledge. This is done in the simplest possible structure, with just two parameters: o-, which measures technological opportunity in both modes of search, and c, the cost of extensive search relative to intensive search. Technological opportunity, o-, here means something quite precise, which, given Assumptions 1-4, uniquely determines the entire distribution of payoffs for the economy in each mode of search. Such sharp conclusions follow from a bare-bones structure. What sort of further modifications could one look for? We end the paper with a series of remarks on possible extensions and other points of interest.
16 US Congress, 1988 . 17 Friedel and Israel (1986 
5A. Many Agents
Ours is not a model of macro fluctuations. If one were to simply add more individuals to our economy, but keep their ideas isolated, the economy's growth rate would quickly converge to a constant, with no waves or cycles of any kind, and the fraction of resources devoted to extensive search would also converge to a constant.20 Spillovers of knowledge are, however, pervasive in modern economies, and it is likely that the invention of something new would soon be followed by waves of applications and refinements. A careful analysis demands a model of diffusion of ideas among individuals or firms; a variety of approaches that could be taken is surveyed by Stoneman (1986) . One would expect, however, that the slower the speed at which ideas spread from one agent to another, the longer it would take for the wave to work itself through. On the other hand, new basic inventions could arrive in the meantime and be added onto existing ones. Too much "mixing" of this sort would tend to eliminate or at least dampen the waves.
5B. Variable Resources Devoted to Search
Not only will the mix of resources devoted to applied and basic research vary over time, so will total research effort of the economy. Thus, at times when g1 > gE, agents may still want to devote some resources to E, while when g, <gE, they might wish to devote even more. Members of a given generation would, in effect, choose the sample size. We have steered clear of this complication, because it can get quite involved (see Morgan (1983) ). A serious treatment in the present context would need to introduce diminishing marginal utility of consumption so as to ensure an interior solution for the fraction of resources devoted to search.
5C. Correlated Wk
Following the Corollary to Lemma 1, we noted that the axioms said nothing about the possible correlation amongst the Wk. Independence maximizes ignorance-by knowing something about technology k, I learn nothing about technology j. But a theory of sustained periods of faster growth through learning may need to exploit such dependence. Suppose, for instance, that K is a subset of the integers, and that it is known that the Wk for k E K is a group of highly correlated technologies-if one works, then they all work. Then clearly, by finding a successful member of K, the economy has excellent growth prospects, as it can now turn to and sample all the other members of K. But how do agents come to believe that the Wk (k E K) are correlated? As a result of experience with prior technologies? Such questions could be pursued by allowing arbitrary, asymmetric correlation amongst the Wk in the prior, but, aside from the general observation that such economies will have higher serial correlations in growth rates,21 not many other results are readily forthcoming.
5D. Relation to the Multi-Arned Bandit
New technologies are sampled infinitely often in this model. This is in contrast to the usual multi-armed bandit result (see Rothschild (1974) for a survey) that eventually the agent settles on one arm and pulls it forever. The reason for the difference between the results of the bandit formulation and our own is that the multi-arm bandit formulation bundles the consumption and investment decisions: to learn about arm k, one must consume the payoff it yields. As soon as one unbundles the two, new arms will be pulled infinitely often, and this is what the present formulation does.
5E. Relation to Bayesian Analysis in General
We follow the Bayesian approach to learning; the prior distribution on the functions Wk( ) is in our case just the Wiener measure discussed in Billingsley (1968) 
